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SUBJECT: (Optional)				
FROM: A/DDP/A			NO.	
			DATE	
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
	RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1. Asst. to the DDI Room 344 Admin Bldg. Attn: Mr. R. W. Komer				
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Executive Registry

60-7909

4 October 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. R. W. Komer

SUBJECT:

[] Sub-Belligerence Paper

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1. At long last I am returning the Sub-Belligerence paper. [] having been the author, the paper is well written, as might be expected. Moreover, in terms of providing initial criteria for consideration in case of particular Soviet sub-belligerent actions I think that the paper is good. My difficulty, however, is that this in the last analysis doesn't give us very much. My reason for saying this is that sound as the criteria provided may be, they are likely to be ~~thought of~~ ^{needed} in relation to a given incident and in the event that an incident occurs, the thinking required for the possible actions will have to go way beyond what [] could do in this more general paper. Perhaps all I am saying is that each instance appears to me to be, of necessity, so particularized that general standards at best can only be moderately useful. Moreover, an unavoidable difficulty faced by [] is the fact that the possible instances which he considers are analyzed on the basis of individual and separate actions rather than what might be more likely as a part of a much broader and wider program. I repeat, however, that as far as it goes (and for the moment can go), the paper seems to me to be pretty good.

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2. Section G is, of course, the one of particular interest to us since it is the one on which we would most probably be called upon for counter measures. Again, everything that George says in his comments under "G" are accurate and relevant but in this section even more than in the others he has been able to add very little to the general state of knowledge. Para. 21 sets forth this very problem.

3. Let me hasten to say that by instinct I have never been much of a believer in planning, particularly where it attempts to deal on a broad basis with general rather loosely specified problems. For this reason, papers of this sort tend to leave me perhaps even colder than they should.

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[]
C. Tracy Barnes
A/DDP/A

Attachment: Sub-Belligerence Paper

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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Tracy Barnes

DATE: 30 August 1960

FROM : R. W. Komer

SUBJECT: Tracy, Gerry Smith sent this to DCI, and DCI mentioned it casually at Deputies Friday (23 August) as being of interest. I have asked ONE for any comments on the Soviet policy angle. But the paper is probably of more direct interest to DDP from the standpoint of planning countermeasures.

Perhaps the paper's chief value is that it points out cogently how we must plan to cope with a broad series of potential Soviet uses of force below the threshold of overt limited war. This is nothing new, of course, but STAT systematic appraisal of the problem is a useful approach to countermeasures planning.

If you people have any comments I should be glad to serve as the channel. Or, if you prefer, send them directly to State: (I think John Bross would be interested in this paper too.)

R. W. Komer

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